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FREE SPEECH & ELECTION LAW: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH VS. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS*
PROF. DAVID BERNSTEIN
PROF. ANDREW KOPPELMAN
PROF. KENNETH L. MARCUS
PROF. EUGENE VOLOKH
MODERATOR: PROF. LILLIAN R. BEVIER**
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Thank you everyone for coming to this panel. I
thank those of you who attended Mark Steyn's speech. Realize that
this is the panel to be at, at least in terms of relevance to some of the
issues that will be confronting the country in the next few years. The
title of the panel is "Free Speech versus Antidiscrimination Law".
We have a very distinguished panel. I'm going to introduce them in
the order in which they will speak, and then I'll just say a few words
about the topic and let them begin. The first panelist is David Bern-
stein. He's a professor of law at George Mason University Law
School, where he's been teaching since 1995. Professor Bernstein at-
tended Brandeis University and received his J.D. from Yale. He's the
author of more than 60 scholarly articles and a book entitled You
Can't Say That!: The Growing Threat of Civil Liberties from Antidis-
crimination Laws.1 I think you can understand why we asked him to
be on this panel and what kind of wonderful contribution he's going to
make.
Those of you who are visitors to Professor Volokh's Volokh Con-
spiracy2 blog will recognize David from his many contributions there.
Our second panelist is Andrew Koppelman on my far left. Is that
symbolic? We'll see.
* This transcript was taken at the Federalist Society's National Lawyer's Convention in
Washington, D.C. on November 21, 2008. North Carolina Central University Law Review would
like to thank the members of the Federalist Society and the panelists for allowing us to bring this
important conversation to our readers.
** Professor BeVier is the David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at
University of Virginia School of Law. She received her B.A from Smith College in 1961 and her
J.D. from Stanford University in 1965.
1. DAVID BERNSTEIN, You CAN'T SAY THAT!: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBER-
TIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS (2004).
2. The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
1
Bernstein et al.: Free Speech & (and) Election Law: Freedom of Speech vs. Anti-Disc
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
208 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:207
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Andrew is the John Paul Stevens professor at
Northwestern Law School. He received his BA from the University of
Chicago and his M.A., J.D. and Ph.D. from Yale. He served as the
law clerk to Chief Justice Ellen Peters of the Connecticut Supreme
Court. He joined the Northwestern Law faculty in 1997, where he
teaches constitutional law and political philosophy and is doing re-
search and writing on paternalism and perfectionism in the law, with
special attention to the law of morals.
Our third panelist will be Eugene Volokh, the Gary T. Schwartz
Professor of Law at UCLA. Eugene received both his B.S. and J.D.
degrees from UCLA, after which he went on to clerk for Judge Kozin-
ski on the Ninth Circuit and then Sandra Day O'Connor before join-
ing UCLA faculty in 1992. He's a very much cited author. He writes
a very important case book on the First Amendment and no doubt is
known to most of you as the host of the Volokh Conspiracy3 blog.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Kenneth Marcus, on my immediate right, is the
Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Visiting Professor of Equality and Jus-
tice in America at Baruch College School of Public Affairs at the City
University of New York. Professor Marcus graduated magna cum
laude from Williams College, received his J.D. from Boalt Hall, and
prior to joining school of public affairs, Professor Marcus served most
recently as the staff director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a
presidential appointment and a position he held from 2004 until 2008,
and a position in which he was the Agency's chief executive officer.
Before I start with just a couple remarks about this panel and what
it is that they're going to address, just a couple of words about how
we're going to proceed. The panelists are each given twelve minutes.
I'm going to cut them short because the panel is already little shorter
than it's scheduled to be. And when the panel is over, I've been asked
to ask you to leave the room, not in a big hurry, but to not sort of tarry
here because you'll want to go out in the hall and perhaps get in line
to attend date the Barbara K. Olson Memorial Lecture, which is the
next event at this occasion for those of you who are ticket holders for
that event.
Once upon a time, in the early days of the civil rights movement, a
panel with the title of this one, the Free Speech versus Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, would have been simply unthinkable because the First
Amendment at that time was thought to be the handmaid of civil
rights. Indeed, if you look at the entire body of First Amendment
doctrine, especially doctrine as it emerged during the civil rights
movement, the early days of the civil rights movement, it's quite clear
3. Id.
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that a substantial number of cases that were decided during those
years were quite self-consciously crafted to enable the civil rights
cause to proceed with freedom and to proceed to success.
Today, however, freedom of speech and freedom of association are
perceived by many not as allies of antidiscrimination values, not as
consistent with antidiscrimination principles, but as impediments to
the achievement of equal rights for all. And the question of how to
reconcile these values that many people now regard as in competition
is what our panelists are going to be addressing today.
So without further ado, I will turn this over to our first panelist,
David Bernstein.
PROFESSOR BERNSTEIN: Thank you. Obviously, this is near and dear
to my heart. And I was watching Mark Steyn's speech. I always tell
people that ... when the people say, oh, don't worry about slippery
slopes, we can regulate some kinds of speech, and nothing will hap-
pen. We don't want holocaust denial, hate speech, violent pornogra-
phy, all this sort of thing. This is what people told me about Canada
20 years [ago]. They said, "Don't worry. Look at Canada; they're
only regulating a little bit, and they're going to stop there. They know
about civil liberties." But now, you publish the Muhammad4 cartoons
or you write something someone objects to, and you find yourself
before a human rights commission.
But in any event, rather than talking about this topic in the general
philosophical sense, we decided to focus on a few hypotheticals on the
current law to see what's going on in the wake of [Boy Scouts v.
Dale]5 and similar cases. So, I'll talk about a situation where a non-
profit is denied a tax exemption because it discriminates based on sex-
ual orientation, or a student group is denied university funding
because it discriminates based on religion or sexual orientation in
choosing its officers or members. A wedding photographer who ref-
uses to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony. And if Lillian
doesn't cut me off and I have time, I'll throw in two more, quickly,
about a religious school that fires a pregnant teacher, who gets preg-
nant out of wedlock, and the United Way Campaign, run by a public
agency, that refuses to allow the Boy Scouts to participate because of
discrimination against homosexuals.
Let's start with the non-profit denied the tax exemption because it
discriminates based on sexual orientation. And let's say that the case
4. The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad controversy started after the daily periodical, Jyllands-
Posten published cartoons mocking Muhammad on September 30, 2005. Craig S. Smith & Ian
Fisher, Temperatures Rise Over Cartoons Mocking Muhammad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3. 2006 at A3.
5. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000).
2009]
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involve a religious university that prohibits same-sex dating. You can
come to our university if you're of homosexual orientation, but no
dating members of the same sex or, if we find out, we expel you.
The university could not pursue a viable First Amendment Freedom
of Religion6 claim at all if it was denied the tax exemption on this
basis, at least not under the federal Constitution. Perhaps under some
state constitutions or state religious freedom, but under federal law,
under the case of Employment Division v. Smith, given that this law is
just a general law saying that you can't discriminate, the fact that this
religious university happens to have its religious views doesn't really
help it.7
So instead, the university would have to rely on Dale8 and argue
that its expressive association rights were infringed upon .... In Dale,
the Court held that the Boy Scouts of America has a constitutional
First Amendment freedom of expressive association right to exclude a
gay scoutmaster from the Scouts on the theory that having a gay
scoutmaster would conflict with the Scouts' message in favor of tradi-
tional sexual morality.9
Now, in our hypothetical, the university is being forced to allow its
students to engage in same-sex dating. This would both interfere with
its ability to form a university committed to its view of Christian val-
ues and also to express an involuntary message to the outside world
that it is okay with homosexual dating and such.
So, there are at least three issues. First, does this actually create a
viable expressive association claim? I think under Dale,'° it clearly
does. If you can exclude a gay scoutmaster for message it sends or for
interference with the ability to spread your message, surely you could
ban same-sex dating.
Second, is the denial of a tax exemption simply the denial of a privi-
lege that you weren't supposed to have to begin with, and therefore,
there's no constitutional violation, or is it in fact something else? I say
it's something else. In my view, if you give everyone else a tax exemp-
tion but a university that is acting within its First Amendment" rights,
it is the same as giving no one a tax exemption and fining that univer-
sity for discriminating. Now under Dale, it seems pretty clear to me
that the government could not fine the university for banning same-
6. U.S. Const. amend. I.
7. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8. Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
9. See id. at 643-44.
10. Id.
11. Supra note 6.
4
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sex dating, so I don't see why you would be allowed to deny it the tax
exemption. 12
Finally, does the government have a compelling interest in prevent-
ing this discrimination sufficient to overcome the university's expres-
sive association right? Well, the state or federal government, if they
were prosecuting this case against the university it would undoubtedly
cite the case of Bob Jones University, where Bob Jones had a ban on
interracial dating.13 And Bob Jones argued it had theological reasons
why it had to ban this. The university went to the Supreme Court, and
the Court ruled against it.' 4 In fact, the Supreme Court said that even
if Bob Jones did have a valid religious freedom argument here, even if
the denial of the tax exemption did impinge on its freedom, it would
still reject the university's First Amendment claim because the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in overcoming discrimination in ed-
ucation and, in fact, in eradicating all discrimination in higher
education. 15
Now, would Bob Jones control our same-sex dating hypothetical? I
would say the answer is no for a couple reasons. First of all, Bob Jones
was a religious freedom case. The Court never took the compelling
interest test as seriously in religious freedom cases as it takes in ex-
pressive cases under the First Amendment. Indeed, of course, the
Court eventually rejected the test entirely in the religious freedom
context in the Smith case.16
Second, it's true that in the 1980s, Justice Brennan wrote a few ex-
pressive association opinions where he also said the government has a
compelling interest in eradicating all discrimination based on sex, in
the Roberts v. Jaycees case, for example.' But since then, since the
1990s at least, there have been a couple of other expressive associa-
tion cases, one involving a St. Patrick's day parade in Boston 8 and the
other, the Dale case, where not a single justice on the Court argued
that the compelling interest the government may have in eradicating
discrimination overcomes a First Amendment expressive association
right. 19
Even in Dale v. Boy Scouts, the issues wasn't, "Does the govern-
ment have a sufficiently strong interest to overcome the Boy Scouts'
12. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 643-44.
13. Bob Jones University v. U.S. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
17. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
18. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
115 S.Ct. 2338 (1995).
19. Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
2009]
5
Bernstein et al.: Free Speech & (and) Election Law: Freedom of Speech vs. Anti-Disc
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
212 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:207
First Amendment right?" Rather, all nine Justices seemed to assume
that the government had no such interest.2° The debate between the
majority and dissent was actually over whether the Boy Scouts really
had an expressive interest, where they really cared about sexuality, or
whether they were really just engaging in invidious discrimination
against gays and this was a mere pretext.21
So I think that the university should win this case, and hopefully
nine-zero.
Let's take our second example, on whether a student group can be
denied university funding because it discriminates based on religion or
sexual orientation in choosing its officers or members. So let's assume
this is a public university and the funding is therefore akin to the Ro-
senberger case. This case says that you have to be viewpoint-neutral in
your funding, which means the First Amendment applies.22 The first
question is, does the university have a policy that all student groups
must be open to all students? This is a university-wide policy. If you
want to run a student group, if you want funding, everyone has to be
allowed to have equal access to that group. If so, I think there's no
First Amendment issue.
I think the university could have that policy if it considered its stu-
dent groups to be part of the educational experience. Just like I, as a
professor, can't exclude people from my class on any particular basis,
if you have a policy that student groups couldn't do that, I think that
would be fine. I think it would be a foolish policy. So, for example, if
a student gay group in University of Mississippi is forced to allow con-
servative Christians to be members and officers, the conservative
Christians could take over the group and change the basis of the
group from helping gay students to try to convert them to heterosexu-
ality. So I think it's a wise policy let student groups decide who their
officers and members should be, but I don't think it's constitutionally
required if it's a neutral policy.
But what if, on the other hand, university policy is that Republicans
are free to exclude Democrats from the college group. Democrats are
free to exclude Republicans. The student NRA is allowed to exclude
pacifists. Pacifists are allowed exclude gun nuts and so forth and so -
no offense.
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR BERNSTEIN: - and so forth and on. But gay students
aren't allowed to exclude Christians who have conservative views on
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).
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sexuality, or Christians aren't allowed to exclude gay rights activists.
Given that the right of expressive association is implicated, so there is
a First Amendment interest here, then the university is engaging in
viewpoint discrimination. And I think in that case, the student group
would have a very plausible and hopefully winning argument before
the courts that they cannot be denied funding for exercising their ex-
pressive association rights when other groups are permitted to decide
who their members and officers should be.
And one last thing about that. We have to differentiate, even then,
between status-based discrimination and ideology-based discrimina-
tion. So, I would think there would not be an expressive association
right if the Christian group, for example, was excluding someone of
homosexual orientation but who profess to agree with their Christian
values, who says, "I do not engage in homosexual activities; I think it's
a sin, but I happen to prefer men in my mind to women for sexual
purposes." And similarly, if, for example, the Christian group said we
won't take someone born Jewish who now professes Christianity, that
would not be an ideological expressive association discrimination
based on someone's viewpoint, but instead they would just be discrim-
inating based on someone's status, a person of Jewish descent.
So, the next example was the wedding photographer. We need to
distinguish again between a photographer who simply refuses to deal
with, say, gay people or black people for any purpose. I've already
taken a photo. I don't want to sell it to you because you're gay or
black, whatever. I think in that case, there's no First Amendment in-
terest involved.
But what if someone comes to a wedding photographer and says,
"We are having a same-sex commitment ceremony and we would like
you to take our wedding photos?" It seems there, while you can argue
that it's a close case, I think there is an artistic component of taking
wedding photographs sufficient to make this a First Amendment in-
terest. I would say that if you're going to make the wedding photogra-
pher take these photos, you are in fact violating the photographer's
First Amendment rights by making him engage in compelled speech.
And while the expressive interest here isn't as big as it might be in
some other cases, the government's interest, on the other hand, is very
slim, unlike, say, the Bob Jones case, where at least the Court was able
to assert the interest of eradicating discrimination in higher educa-
tion.23 There are so many wedding photographers in any given town,
why would a gay couple even want a photographer who doesn't ap-
prove of same-sex commitment ceremonies to take their photo-
23. Bob Jones. 461 U.S. 574, 604.
2009]
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graphs? It can't be that they think this person's going to be able to see
the same beauty in their ceremony as someone who approves of it!
So it strikes me that the only reason anyone would even file a claim
for discrimination in this context is spite. "We feel annoyed that you
didn't want to take our pictures, and now we're going to get back at
you." And it seems to me, being offended or being spiteful or trying
to get revenge is not a decent reason to overcome someone's First
Amendment rights.
The obvious tough question is, well, are you just picking on gays for
some reason, or would your same analysis apply to someone who ref-
uses to photograph, for ideological reasons, interracial ceremonies or
Jewish ceremonies or Muslim ceremonies or Hindu ceremonies or
take your pick? And I think it applies in any of those cases, again, as
long as you have actually have an ideological reason and you're not
just saying I don't want to deal with that particular group for any pur-
pose. I just don't want to be seen as approving using my artistic tal-
ents to approve of this particular ceremony. For that matter, the same
principle would apply if a Jewish photographer refuses to do an inter-
marriage for ideological reasons.
So, let me throw in those last two hypotheticals. Lillian says one
more hypothetical.
PROFESSOR BERNSTEIN: So I'll do the one about the Christian school
because this has actually something that's come up a lot. I haven't
seen a post-Dale case on it, but I would be very interested to see how
it comes out. Should a Christian school that believes in traditional
sexual morality and tells its students and its teachers that the teachers
are role models for the school's beliefs be allowed to fire an unmar-
ried teacher who gets pregnant out of wedlock? I think the answer is
pretty clearly yes given that forcing the school to retain the teacher
would make it more difficult for the school to promote its religious
ideology. Again, I think this is even a clearer case than Dale. But
there hasn't been, as far as I know, any post-Dale cases on this. Thank
you.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Out next speaker is Andy Koppelman.
Professor Koppelman.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: [H]ere, I'm going to fail in my commission
by agreeing with David about the regulation of student group cases.
In his hypothetical, you've got a university that's discriminating on the
basis of viewpoint, saying that some viewpoint-based exclusions from
student groups are okay, but there were some viewpoints we don't
like, and you can't exclude people on that basis.
8
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Well, I think that is viewpoint discrimination even if the conduct
itself is not constitutionally protected, even if it's okay for the univer-
sity generally to say student groups aren't allowed to exclude people
on the basis of viewpoint. It still can't itself have favored and disfa-
vored views. That's the holding of R.A.V. v. St. Paul.24 But notice
how narrow the exception is. As long as the university can ban dis-
crimination that has nothing to do with viewpoint, if the university
does that, then we don't have a First Amendment claim.
Another possibility is that you've got some government regulation
that compels speech. This is his concern in the wedding photographer
case. Here, it seems to me the wedding photographer's is a close
question because it depends on how expressive the service is. It is
true that a photograph can be an expression, but this isn't universally
true of all photographs. So, let's imagine a drugstore that takes pass-
port photo on the side. And so in the back of the store, there is a
camera bolted to the floor and a chair bolted to the floor, and you sit
in the chair, and the store takes your picture. And the guy who runs
the store happens to agree with Dred Scott; he doesn't think that
blacks should be citizens .2  And so, he's got an ideological objection
to taking passport photos of black people. It seems to me that his
First Amendment claim is pretty attenuated.
And so, then we have to ask about the wedding photographer.
How expressive is this really? There's a limit to how much discretion
a wedding photographer has. The wedding photographer, I don't
think is going to be able to say, you know something? I don't think
that the bride is as attractive as the maid of honor, so my aesthetic is
we should photograph the groom with the maid of honor. If you're a
professional wedding photographer, I advise you not to do this.
You're not going to go far in your career. So I think that there's some
question whether the wedding photographer is in fact engaged in an
expressive business or whether it's just another business that holds
itself out to the public selling a service.
It's also possible for regulation to have an impact on speech that is
negative. So, it can be applied, for example, in a way that requires
you actually to bear a message containing words that you disagree
with. And that's the Hurley case, where the St. Patrick's Day parade
24. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (petitioner charged under Minnesota's Bias-Motivated crime ordi-
nance after allegedly burning a cross on the yard of an African-American family). The Supreme
Court held that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it arose to content discrimi-
nation - prohibiting otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addressed - in violation of the First Amendment. Id.
25. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that descendents of the African
race who were brought to the United States as slaves were not citizens within the meaning of the
Constitution), superseded by statute, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2009]
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was being required by the city of Boston to include messages, words
on signs, that it disagreed with.26 But even that's not enough to get
you to, I think, the cases that David wants to center on, which is cases
of expressive association - so the case of the nonprofit denied tax
exemptions because it discriminates based on sexual orientation or the
case of the religious school who fires a pregnant teacher.
In order to make those First Amendment claims, you've got to rely
on Dale v. Boy Scouts of America.27 And so, to understand what is
protected by Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, I think that it's necessary
to get into just what the reasoning was of that case. So for anyone
who doesn't remember - it's been a couple years now - Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America involved a man who had been a member the Boy
Scouts since he'd been a child.2 8
He gets out of the Boy Scouts, he goes to college, and he remains
on the rolls of the Boy Scouts as a scoutmaster even though he's not
attached to any particular troop.29 And he gives an interview to a
newspaper in which he identifies as a leader of a gay student group at
his school.3" He doesn't mention in the newspaper story that he's ever
been associated with the Boy Scouts.3 But the Boy Scouts finds out
about this and throws him out, and he brings a complaint under New
Jersey's human rights law against the Boy Scouts. 32
The New Jersey Supreme Court upholds his claim against the Boy
Scouts, and it comes up to the Supreme Court, which in a Rehnquist
opinion reverses.33 The New Jersey court found, relying on previous
law, that in order to decide whether a group has an expressive associa-
tion claim, you've got to look at the group's message and try to decide
whether including this person would interfere with that group's mes-
sage.34 And the New Jersey courts found the Boy Scouts haven't said
anything in particular about homosexuality.35 They haven't got any
message that's contradicted by Dale's presence.36
Now, there could be cases where the entity is sending a message
that is contradicted by the individual's presence. In the case of the
26. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995)(holding that the state courts' application of Massachusetts' public accommodation law
essentially required the defendants, private citizens, to alter the expressive content of their
parade, violating defendants' First Amendment rights).
27. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
28. See id. at 644.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 645.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 646, 661.
34. Id. at 646-647.
35. Id.
36. Id.
10
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Christian school, depending on what they teach in the Christian
school, the Christian school might have a pretty good claim that, look,
we're trying to teach our students that premarital sex is not okay. If
we've got an unmarried teacher who's pregnant and on our staff,
that's going to interfere with our capacity to send that message, and
we can show you that we've been teaching that message. So that
claim probably is going to prevail.
But that was not available in the Boy Scout case because the New
Jersey courts found as a matter of fact that the Boy Scouts had not
been teaching any message at all about sexuality, 37 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court is not - appellate courts generally are not - well posi-
tioned to reverse cases because they disagree about facts. Trial courts
find facts. So, what the Court did instead is it reasoned as follows: it
found that the Scouts are an association that engages in expressive
activity that is protected by the First Amendment, so forced inclusion
violates the First Amendment if it would significantly affect the Boy
Scouts' ability to advocate their viewpoint.38
Now, they say that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the val-
ues embodied in the Scout oath and law, particularly those repre-
sented by the requirement that Scouts be "morally straight" and
"clean".39 You might not have thought that those spoke to the issue
of homosexuality, but the Boy Scouts say that they do.40 The Court
said it has to give deference: "The Court gives deference to [an organ-
ization's] assertions regarding the nature of its expression," and "must
also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression."41 Well, this gets around the problem of the Boy Scouts
not having a clear message.
The problem with this rule of deference, though, is that it means
that any defendant in any antidiscrimination suit can say, "Look, you
may not have noticed, but I'm trying to send a message and admitting
this person - Ollie's Barbeque - is trying to send a message about
white supremacy. Maybe we didn't mention it before, but we're ex-
cluding this black person, and you know, we think we're sending this
message and you have to defer to us on that."'42 And that's going to
happen with any anti-discrimination suit at all. So, all antidiscrimina-
tion laws are unconstitutional in all of their applications. Now, that
37. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1202-03 (N.J. 1999), Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 706 A.2d 270, 274-75 (N.J. Super. 1998).
38. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-50.
39. Id. at 650 (discussing the Boy Scouts' arguments before the Supreme Court).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 641, 653.
42. See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
2009]
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does not seem to be what the Court wanted to say in Dale v. Boy
Scouts, but that's the implication.43
Now, the Court also said, "That is not to say that an expressive as-
sociation can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by
asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group
would impair its message."44 But then you wonder, "Well, so what are
they saying?" It's very hard to tell, and the lower courts have not
been able to figure it out. If you look at the lower courts' treatment of
Dale, the lower courts have basically confined Dale to its facts. 5 In
order to bring a successful claim in the lower federal courts, you need
to either be the Boy Scouts, and even then you don't always win, or
you need to be Louis Farrakhan trying to exclude women from an all-
male meeting.46 There, the fact that it's a religious entity seems to add
some weight to his claim.4
7
There is a second claim in Dale that David alluded to, having to do
with being forced to send a message - and the Dale Court said this
also - that accepting Dale as a member would force a message of
approval of homosexuality.48 The problem here is the claim seems to
be that any time that a law requires me to engage in conduct that's
that is conventionally assumed to carry a certain meaning, it is com-
pelled speech, West Virginia v. Barnette"9 compelled speech, to force
me to obey this law. This also has strange implications.
So, General Motors, in the newspapers lately, really didn't want to
be required to include airbags in cars and lobbied against it.50 They
43. 530 U.S. 640.
44. Id. at 653.
45. See generally Villegas V. City of Gilroy, 484 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007), Gathright v. City
of Portland, 439 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2006), Recreational Developments of Phoenix, Inc. v. City of
Phoenix, 220 F. Supp.2d 1054 (D. Ariz. 2002).
46. Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762 N.E.2d 835 (Mass. 2002); Chicago Council of Boy Scouts
of Am. v. City of Chicago, 748 N.E. 2d 759 (Ill. 1st Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 316 (Ill.
2001); Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm. on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 2002); see also
Boy Scouts of Am., South Florida Council v. Till, 136 F. Supp.2d 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (public
school is a limited public forum that cannot exclude scouts from meeting space because of disa-
greement with viewpoint). But even the Scouts have gotten only limited mileage from Dale.
The City of Berkeley was not prevented from revoking the Scouts' privilege of docking their
boats rent-free in the city's marina. See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 65 P.3d 402 (Cal. 2003), cert.
denied, 127 S.Ct. 434 (2006). Nor was the state of Connecticut barred from excluding the Scouts
from its state employees' charitable campaign. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 (2004). See also Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 471
F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (avoiding federal question by certifying to California Supreme Court
question of whether leasing of public park land to Scouts violated religion clauses of state
constitution).
47. Id. at 840-41.
48. 530 U.S. at 648.
49. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
50. See, e.g., Kendra Marr, Carmakers Lobbying as They Get Bailout Money, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 2009, at D03.
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were required to do it. So after Dale, can General Motors say, "Look,
if we put airbags into cars, people are going to infer from that that we
think that airbags are cost-effective. It's compelled speech for us to be
required to put airbags in our cars." So, this reading of Dale also
seems to be unduly broad.
So, I guess my deepest and most fundamental disagreement with
David about the compelled speech claim, which is the way that he
makes his claim about the nonprofit, is that Dale, precisely because it
is so massively over-broad in its writing, has been construed by the
lower federal courts not to mean anything at all, and therefore, you
cannot rely on it as the basis for any First Amendment claim against
any law.5'
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Our next speaker is Professor Volokh.
PROFESSOR VOLOKH: Thank you. We had a little bit of a technologi-
cal adventure, but I think we've managed to get out unscathed.
So, the title of this part of this talking panel is "Freedom of Speech
Versus Hostile Environmental Harassment Law." I've written about
this quite a bit, and if anybody is interested, I have a lot of material
collected on my web page. It should also be in the CLE materials. I
started writing about it about 15 years ago, back when most of the
action was in hostile work environment harassment. But today, I'm
going to talk about hostile education, public accommodation, and
housing programs, as well, because the law has indeed shifted more
and more in that direction.
So, first of all, what is harassment? Harassment means many things
in many contexts. For example, there's a crime of telephone harass-
ment. That, we're not going to talk about. There's a crime of harass-
ment in other contexts, so essentially persistent mailing or telephoning
or approaches to people. Again, not the issue.
For our purposes, we're talking about hostile environment harass-
ment. We're also setting aside quid pro quo harassment, sexual extor-
tion-sleep with me or you're fired. We're talking about hostile
environment harassment. And hostile environment harassment de-
fines speech and conduct, but including speech, to be harassment if it's
sincere or pervasive enough to create a hostile, abusive, or offensive
work environment, or educational environment, or public accommo-
dations environment, or housing environment based on race, religion,
sex, national origin, age, disability, military membership, veteran sta-
tus and, in some jurisdictions, sexual orientation and the
51. The analysis here is developed in detail in ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRING-
TON WoLFF, A RiGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? How THE CASE OF Boy Scours OF AMERICA v.
JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION, (Yale University Press, 2009).
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rest-basically, all the categories covered by antidiscrimination for the
plaintiff and for a reasonable person.
As a consequence, the employer-the college, the restaurant, the
landlord, depending on which branch of hostile environment law
you're talking about-is liable for a court-ordered damages award
based on the speech and possibly injunction against the speech.52 In-
terestingly, generally speaking, the damages award doesn't run against
the actual speaker but rather against the employer or college or res-
taurant or landlord that tolerated the speech.53 Although, in some
situations, you will find damages awards and injunctions against the
individual speakers as well. 4 My view is that actually doesn't really
matter for First Amendment purposes.
The premise of harassment law is the law bars discrimination in all
those contexts; discrimination in terms of conditions, for example, of
employment.55 The quality of the environment is one of the terms or
conditions of employment.56 Therefore, when the employer tolerates
an environment that is offensive, particularly for a particular group, it
is therefore discriminating even if it didn't create it, it discriminates
through tolerating this environment, whether the environment was
created by its managers, by its employees, by customers, by contract
contractors or whoever else.57
That's a lot of words, but what does it mean? Well, generally speak-
ing a considerable range of speech has been found to have helped
create a hostile environment, some of the time standing alone, some-
time coupled with other things. But clearly, even when coupled with
conduct, the speech was included as part of what pushed the aggregate
past the legally significant threshold of hostile environment: racially,
religiously, sexually or ethnical offensive political or social statements,
sexually themed humor, misogynistic rap music, sexually themed art,
music videos depicting sexually provocative conduct, religious
proselytizing.58
To give two things which are clearly examples of the first: state-
ments by an NYPD counterterrorism adviser arguing that Islam is evil
and Muslims are security; 9 allegedly racist imagery displayed in bars.
There's a case in Boston where there was a display, kind of a jungle-
52. See, e.g., Dicenso v. Cisneros. 96 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 1996).
53. 45B Am. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 847 (2008).
54. E.g., Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings, 729 N.E.2d 813, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
55. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008).
56. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
57. Holmes v. Utah Dep't of Workforce Servs. 483 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. E.g., Page v. City of Chicago, 701 N.E.2d 218,229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding a hostile
environment based on supervisor's sexually themed comments to an employee).
59. Doe v. City of N.Y., 583 F. Supp.2d 444, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol31/iss2/6
FREE SPEECH PANEL
themed display, during February, which the manager or the owner
says, well, that was just meant to kind of create a warm tone in a cold
Boston winter.6 ° But there was evidence that a bartender made some
racist allusions with regard to that, saying that this is the liberation of
African history month and pointing to a gorilla and saying that repre-
sents Martin Luther King, Jr.61 So if the claims about the bartender
are to be believed, then this was in fact racist statements. And it's
part of imagery displayed in a bar.
All of this is stuff that one would generally think, it seems to me, is
protected by the First Amendment. Threats are not protected by the
First Amendment.62 Incitement (inaudible) violence maybe but not
protected by the First Amendment.63 Certain kinds of face-to-face in-
sults are unprotected. 64 But racially,6" religiously,66 sexually offen-
sive 67 speech generally speaking is.
Now, what effect does the law have? Well, I should say that in
many of these instances, I can tell you for sure that, yes, this speech
would indeed be severe or pervasive enough, especially given those
vague terms of "severe" or "pervasive," to create a hostile, abusive, or
offensive environment. Those terms are vague enough that you can't
be sure. In some cases, there's liability; in other cases, there may not
be liability. But this very vagueness, it seems to me, exacerbates the
First Amendment problem here. And I quote here from the Supreme
Court actually, from Justice Brennan: Vagueness leads people to
"steer far wider of the unlawful zone" and leads to over-deterrence on
the speaker's part, where the speaker avoids any speech that might be
punishable and not just speech that is sure to be punishable.68
An example that I give is, imagine your client comes to you and
asks you for advice. Look, one of my employees, students, patrons is
complaining about offensive speech by others. I'd rather not suppress
the speech. I'm sure I have the right to. I mean, as the property
owner, I'm entitled to. But I really want to avoid liability. What
should I do to be safe? It could be harsh condemnation of religion,
Clinton-Lewinsky jokes - by the way, there were specific comments
60. Tatsha Robertson, S. Boston Bar, MCAD Settle Complaint, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
20, 2000, at B2.
61. Jeff Jacoby, A Rush to Censor, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2000, at A19.
62. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492-93 (1st Cir. 1997).
63. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952).
64. E.g., White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991) (holding that certain
insults may rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress when made by a super-
visor to an employee).
65. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134-35 (1966).
66. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160-64
(2002).
67. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 687-90 (1959).
68. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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in the employment law press about that, talking about how, in fact,
yeah, you should tell people not to say such things because that can
create a sexually hostile environment.69 Or a sexually suggestive print
hanging in someone's office-there've been complaints about
that70-allegedly racist political statements,71 comments criticizing vet-
erans harshly.72 And this could be in a factory, in a newspaper, a uni-
versity, a bar, a bookstore. All those are workplaces, right?
Workplaces. One of them is an educational place. Some of them are
places of public accommodation as well.
What would you say? Would you say, well, no, you're safe? I doubt
it. I'd say, you'd say, look, I don't know. Maybe you'd be held liable;
maybe not. But the safe bet, especially since the speech is by your
employees or your patrons and not by you, your safe bet-so you'd get
all the cost of the speech and don't get really any of the benefit-the
safe bet is to restrict the speech.
Now, it's true that generally speaking .... [T]his only applies to
speech that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile, abusive,
or offensive work environment.73 Single incidents of speech, generally
speaking, aren't supposed to be enough,74 although, for example, in
one case a dozen incidents over twenty months, of which only four
were actually heard by the offended employee and the eight were
heard by the person by hearsay, was considered to be enough.75
But the important thing is, the requirement cannot help because a
client cannot order its employees to say, look, do not say things, which
is aggregated with other speech or severe or pervasive to create an
offensive environment. First of all, that would be too vague for peo-
ple to apply on the ground. I do not know what that means. But sec-
ond, if my statement coupled with your statement, with your
statement, with your statement, even though we do not know about
each other's statements, can in the aggregate create a hostile, abusive,
or offensive environment. The only way that you as the employer can
be safe-or again, as the owner of the place of public accommodation
or as the educator can be safe-is by restricting each individual state-
ment. Only then, can you prevent the aggregate.
69. Diane Sears Campbell, Don't Cause a Scandal-Be Careful What You Say, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 1998, at E4.
70. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
71. Amber Pyramid, Inc. v. Buffington Harbor Riverboats, L.L.C., 129 Fed. App'x 292, 296
(7th Cir. 2005).
72. Petersen v. Dep't of the Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227, 235-37 (1996).
73. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
74. Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
75. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1997).
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This is exactly what experts recommend because the legal bounda-
ries are so poorly marked, the best course of action is to avoid all
sexually offensive conduct, including speech, in the workplace. To
deal with harassment, it is necessary to the individual actions that,
when added up, amount to institutional discrimination. These are not
people with some First Amendment ax to grind; these are just employ-
ment lawyers giving advice.
Here is another example. In an article76 aimed at people in restau-
rant management saying that if one of your waiters overhears a pa-
tron-because remember, a hostile environment can be created not
just by coworkers but by patrons, so long as the patron could be disci-
plined, for example, by being kicked out by the owner if a patron is
telling religious jokes in the waiter's presence-not even certainly to
the waiter, but just around the waiter-then in that case, the waiter
should tell the patron, stop. And if not, then in that case, the non-
employee harasser must be warned that sanctions [will follow] . . .
future harassing conduct.
So here, you thought you were free to speak in restaurants, at least
free form government restriction. A private entity could just say,
look, we'll kick you out because it is our property. But at least free
from the government forcing people or pressuring oppression into
kicking you out, apparently not. Likewise, there are injunctions en-
forcing the law. And injunctions, after all, are trying to prevent the
continued violations. Just like employers on their own try to prevent
initial violations, they ban each individual incident, including speech
that is pretty clearly constitutionally protected.
That's true in workplaces like factories. It's true in workplaces that
are even created-I'm not talking about injunctions; I'm talking about
the possibility of hostile environment law applying-even in work-
places in which there is a further First Amendment product being cre-
ated because every place is someone's workplace. A writer's office is
someone's workplace. A university is someone's workplace. A class-
room is someone's workplace. A newspaper is someone's workplace.
So, coworkers who are offended by things being said by journalists, by
writers and such, can sue and, in some of these situations, have sued.
The first of these cases, actually the California Supreme Court re-
jected on an interpretation of state law that actually does not mirror
federal law, so the same lawsuit could have been brought under fed-
eral law and might well prevail.
76. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom Of Speech In Cyberspace From The Listener's Perspective:
Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, And Sex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377
(1996).
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So where do harassment lawsuits suppress speech? Well, first in
workplaces, where most people spend one third of waking hours.
That includes libraries, art colleges, government buildings, restau-
rants.77 In universities there's hostile education environment law.78
In bars,79 private clubs,8" libraries, 81 and restaurants,8" that is hostile
public accommodation environment law. Hostile housing environ-
ment law, which is just beginning to emerge, suggests that if, for exam-
ple, some tenants say things, not even to a particular person but in the
hearing of a particular person-they've put up signs or they say things
in common areas that are overheard, then the landlord may have a
duty to silence the tenants.83
So, the result is the government-again, it's not just the private prop-
erty owner-it's the government, through threat of liability, it's expres-
sing speech that offends on these various bases when said by
employers, employees, students, or patrons, including political speech,
religious speech, art, social commentary in all of these various places.
It's a conscience-based and viewpoint-based restriction. Unprotected
speech is not just conduct, it's not just that you can discriminate in the
sense of you can't fire people, you can't refuse to hire people. If the
people are being punished precisely because their speech contains a
particular content-now to be sure, the fear is not of the content as
such; it is of the harm of the offensive environment that's created by
this content and an environment that is more offensive to people of
some groups than other groups. I agree. But almost all speech restric-
tions do not aim at the speech as such; they aim at the speech because
of the harm that the speech supposedly yields.
So, let me just close by saying that I think there has got to be an
answer. One possible answer-some say it is a safe harbor for some
political statements. Some say safe harbor for some favored work-
places. Okay, restrict the speech in the law firms, let us say, and in the
factories and such, but at the very least, in the newspapers and univer-
sities and other places it has to be protected. Some say safe harbor for
all speech except the low-value speech. I argue that actually there
77. See id; Eugene Volokh, Freedom Of Speech And Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791 (1992).
78. See generally Escue v. Northern OK College, 450 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing
application of hostile educational environment claim with respect to sexual harassment). See
also Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist. 524,U.S. 274 (1998).
79. Valadez v. Uncle Julio's of Illinois, Inc., 895 F. Supp 1008 (N.D. I11. 1995).
80. See generally In re Minnesota by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d
844 (Minn. 1985).
81. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the
Clinton Administration, 63-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 326-334 (Winter/Spring 2000).
82. See generally Sambo's v. City Council of City of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (discussing protected speech in context of potentially offensive restaurant name).
83. See Szkoda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n., 706 N.E.2d 962 (I11. App. Ct. 1998).
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ought to be some latitude for restricting one-to-one speech, kind of
personal insults even not rising to the level of fighting words, but not
for speech that is said to the workplace at large or said to at least some
willing listeners.
But I think some answer-I would not choose one, two or three, but
I would instead choose four. Some answer is necessary because there
is a very serious First Amendment problem here.
(Applause.)
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Thanks, Eugene. Our next speaker is Kenneth
Marcus. Professor Marcus.
PROFESSOR MARCUS: Thank you. Good afternoon. For about 20
years, I happily enough sat in these seats watching these talks with my
nice pitcher of water and little sucky candies they give you and was
perfectly content. I knew that I might or might not be able to ask a
question, but at least nobody would ask a question of me. It was a
safe place to be. And then recently, I got a call, and I was told that my
name had gone to the top of the list and that it was my turn to speak at
one of these things. But the catch was that the topic is the First
Amendment, the prior speaker is Eugene Volokh-
PROFESSOR MARCUS:-he has already called dibs on the pro side, and I
get what's left. So I'm very pleased to be here, with some trepidation.
I think that Professor Volokh has given us an excellent overview. I
think that there are some important respects in which I think he's
nailed the issue. I think that there's at least one important respect in
which he has understated the extent of the problem. But I think that
there are also some important respects in which I think he has over-
stated it or at least in which the problem can be resolved perhaps a
little more easily than he might think.
Let me start with what I think that he's gotten right. For many peo-
ple, I think the problem of this conflict between free speech and an-
tidiscrimination law is resolved by the stringency of the civil rights
standards.84 After all, in order to succeed in a hostile environment
84. In other words, as Professor Volokh has previously observed, "If there is anything about
harassment law that prevents liability based on [protected] speech, it has to be the severity/
pervasiveness component." Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment"
Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997). This position is reflected, for example, in
the guidance on the First Amendment limitations of sexual harassment law issued by the U.S.
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). In a regulatory policy statement
developed by the Clinton Administration and reissued by the George W. Bush Administration,
OCR announced that "[i]n order to establish a violation of Title IX, the harassment must be
sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the educa-
tion program." See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employ-
ees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997) (Rev. Jan. 19, 2001).
The tacit principle here is that the stringency of this harassment standard protects against First
2009]
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claim, depending on the particular context, you usually have to make
a showing that the extent of the problem was so severe, pervasive and
objectively offensive that it denied educational opportunities or that it
was so severe and pervasive that it changed the terms of employ-
ment.85 It's easy to think, well, now, if that's what we're talking about,
not just a single incident or a few incidents, but something that's that
severe and pervasive, that's that bad, then it must be a low value of
speech, and we're not really talking about the sorts of things that
cause First Amendment problems.
And I think that one of the values in Professor Volokh's presenta-
tion is that it drives home that, in fact, as long as you acknowledge, as
one must, that sometimes harassment takes the form of words and as
long as we bar hostile environment, even single incidents can poten-
tially be at risk if not before a court of law, then certainly in the face
of an organization that wants to comply.86 And I think that's true for
some of the reasons he said and maybe others that he suggested,
which is to say, to start with, that there are some courts that will be
overly aggressive and will find liability with one or only a few inci-
dents, a second that a cautious lawyer in some cases, will deal strongly
with even single incidents.87 And of course, if you are a manager or a
leader and you are aware of even the one incident, you don't know
that there aren't other things that have been happening or will happen
if you do nothing. So it really is a conundrum.
Let me tell you one way in which I think Professor Volokh has un-
derstated the problem. The conflict, as I see is not just between
speech and antidiscrimination law; it's between speech and something
that's much larger and which I would call the "diversity project."
Amendment infringements. See Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-
Semitism and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 WM. & MARY B. RTs. J. 837, 885-87 (2007) (analyz-
ing the relationship between statutory and regulatory harassment standards and the First
Amendment).
85. See David v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 659-60 (1999) ("[S]evere per-
vasive and objectively offensive").
86. Indeed, this observation has been one of Professor Volokh's important contributions to
the subject. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 83 (explaining the effect of harassment standards on the
suppression of protected speech).
87. Indeed, OCR's regulatory guidance explicitly announces that "a single or isolated inci-
dent of sexual harassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment." Sexual Har-
assment Guidance, supra note 83. This guidance appears to conflict with the holding in Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Ed. In that case the Court instructed that
[a]lthough, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment
could be said to have an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress would have thought such
behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the inevitability of student misconduct and
the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifference
to a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53. For one potential means of resolving this conflict, see Marcus, supra
note 83, at 806 n.292.
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There's a conflict between speech and a cluster of values, policies, and
practices which include not just equal opportunity but also affirmative
action and diversity management dealing with the way we deal with
differences. 8 This is to say that even aside from antidiscrimination
law, there are lots of reasons why organizations might clamp down on
offensive speech dealing with broader issues of diversity. And I'll tell
you a little bit about what I mean.
Suppose there is someone making offensive statements on a univer-
sity campus or in a corporation or some other area where the civil
rights laws apply, and an organizational leader needs to figure out,
"Do I have to do something about it?" Well, there are lots of reasons
why an organizational leader might have to act and act quickly even
aside from potential liability. The organization might have adopted a
set of diversity values which include a strong commitment to a culture
of respect and civility which exceeds the minimum requirements of
the law.
And frequently I hear that from leaders of organizations that they
do not merely want to meet the minimum requirements of the antidis-
crimination law. Rather, they want to create a culture which is even
more protective of the sorts of civility norms that they believe in. So
they want to exceed the minimum requirements.
Second, an organization may value forms of diversity which they
feel are threatened by certain forms of offensive behavior, which fall
far short of the legal standard. And one approach would be to say, if
we are afraid that certain minorities or other groups will be driven out
of an organization if they feel unwelcome, then we need to deal very
boldly with offensive conduct, even apart from liability issues.
Third, the organization may want to choose to protect its members
from even subjectively offensive behavior out of a sense of protective-
ness, even of highly sensitive employees or students or other
stakeholders.
Fourth, there may be internal political pressures, public relations
concerns, or reputational interests which require prompt action.
And finally, white guilt may play a role when an organization feels
that there's been a history of discrimination or perhaps even contin-
88. The distinction between the related concepts of "equal opportunity," "affirmative ac-
tion," and "diversity management" is now well established in the academic and consulting litera-
ture, even if the terms are widely conflated in common discourse. For two useful, practical
discussions of the relationship between these concepts R. ROOSEVELT THOMAS, JR., BUILDING
ON THE PROMISE OF DIVERSITY: How WE CAN MOVE TO THE NEXT LEVEL IN OUR WORK-
PLACES, OUR COMMUNrTES AND OUR SOCIETY 49-63 (2006); David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely,
Making Differences Matter, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON MANAGING DIVERSITY 33-66
(2001). A more theoretical discussion of the conceptual and political foundations of these con-
cepts, albeit in the British context, may be found in GIL KIRTON & ANNE-MARIE GREENE, THE
DYNAMICS OF MANAGING DIVERSITY: A CRITICAL APPROACH 113-139 (2d ed. 2005).
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ued discrimination of some sort that they cannot locate, and that over-
reaction to statements that they find may be a way of dealing with it.89
For all of these reasons, it seems to me that even if there were no
antidiscrimination laws, some of the norms and values within certain
organizations would create the same sorts of issues that Professor
Volokh describes.
Furthermore, I'm not even convinced that antidiscrimination law is
the main driver. Oftentimes, we think that the potential of liability is
the main driver in dealing with censorship. But it seems to me that
potential liability sometimes will curb corporate or university behav-
ior and sometimes will not. It may depend, not only on the extent of
the potential liability but also on the extent to which the values under-
lying the legal principles are embraced by the relevant community.
For example, look at the response of universities to Gratz v. Bollin-
geT.9° Despite the post-Gratz liability potential, many universities
don't seriously consider race-neutral alternatives before commencing
or continuing the use of non-remedial, racially preferential affirmative
action.91 Another example is the failure of many public universities to
withdraw vague or invasive hate speech codes, despite a host of lower
court decisions which require them to do so. 92 It seems to me that
even when the potential for liability appears to be the driver, it's not
just liability, it's liability plus either certain underlying norms or else
the risk of the liability which in dollar terms is very high. So what I'm
saying here is that this is an even broader problem in some ways than
Professor Volokh describes, but the antidiscrimination law is only one
small piece, and if you took it away, the same problem might exist
even to the same extent.
Now, how has he overstated the problem? Two respects. First,
when you consider the different motivations on an employer, it seems
to me that the cautious employer is going to overreact to the potential
for civil rights liability if they do not have an opposing set of potential
liabilities. If they are a public employer and they have potential liabil-
ity for First Amendment violations, then it seems to me that there are
opposing sets of values which change the dynamic and change the set
89. See generally SHELBY STEELE, WHITE GUILT: How BLACKS & WHITES TOGETHER DE-
STROYED THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2007).
90. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
91. See George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, Serious Consideration of Race-Neutral Al-
ternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 991, 994, 1026 (2008).
92. See Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech Codes and the Two
Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 345, 345, 387-88 (2001).
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of incentives. 93 So, much of this discussion I think applies to a far
greater extent with private than public employers.
Additionally, it seems to me that if we think that there is a choice
between complying with civil rights requirements or accepting free-
dom of speech, we've embraced a fallacy of false alternatives because
the organization, whether an employer or a university, which wants to
deal with offensive speech has a wide range of things, speech-neutral
alternatives that it can employ.94 And it seems to me that the cautious
employer or university has to do something when there's even one
example of offensive speech, but that the reasonable alternative under
current law isn't necessarily to censor it.
There are any number of things that the university or employer can
do.95 To begin with, there are a host of regulatory alternatives which
are speech-neutral, at least with respect to protected speech. The or-
ganization can regulate non-speech elements. It could regulate time,
place, or manner through viewpoint-neutral regulations. It could reg-
ulate non-protected speech, whether it's incitement, obscenity, defa-
mation, or fighting words. It can regulate speech in non-forum private
areas. It can regulate speech that furthers a discriminatory scheme,
such as postings of "No Jews Need Apply" or some such thing. It can
devise enhanced penalties under conduct codes for otherwise imper-
missible conduct. And this is just the regulatory approaches which are
speech-neutral.
Of course, an organization also has a wide range of non-regulatory
alternatives which in many cases will be more reasonable reactions to
offensive conduct and include speech. They include leadership state-
ments that abjure hatred, non-academic programs that embrace diver-
sity, statements of tolerance and respect, training and orientation
dealing with legal compliance or articulating the business case for di-
versity, and academic diversity programs. All of these are available,
and many of them are going to reasonable.
Now there are times when employers and other potential defend-
ants may have defenses available to them which require that they can
articulate the ways in which they have responded reasonably to a hos-
93. For an instructive discussion of the manner in which these two sets of values, or narra-
tive frames, conflict in higher education, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Con-
stitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 345 (1991).
94. The extent to which a public institution must seriously consider these speech-neutral
alternatives before adopting speech-restrictive policies is an issue that I will leave for another
day.
95. For an excellent discussion of what I call the "speech-neutral alternatives" available to
higher education administrators, see WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, 1 THE LAW OF
HIGHER EDUCATION § 9.6.3. (4th ed. 2007).
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tile environment. 96 But the reasonableness requirement can be mea-
sured by a number of standards, including the existence of policies
and procedures to deal with it.97 Unquestionably, there is an incentive
here to be able to show that one has followed a grievance procedure
and punished those who have been found to have violated it.
On the other hand, it seems to me that a proper reading of the law
is that each of these requirements is not independently required and
that, depending on the circumstances, punishing a speaker who en-
gages only in protected conduct is not necessarily the reasonable way
of addressing it as long as the organization can say that they haven't
done nothing but they've reasonably engaged in one or more of the
wide range of alternatives that are available to it. So, in other words,
the cautious organization doesn't necessarily do as Professor Volokh
suggested. Certainly, in a public context, that very much isn't the right
way to go. Even in the private context, when an employer or other
organizer chooses to censor speech as way of avoiding liability for a
hostile environment, they've chosen that alternative rather than a
speech-neutral alternative for reasons of their own and not because it
is required by law.
The one last thing I'll say in closing is that one way out of the co-
nundrum or answer to the question of whether it is appropriate to
regulate what is, in fact, the viewpoint of certain forms of speech in
order to avoid a hostile environment, can be found in Justice Scalia's
opinion for R.A. V., when he pointed out that since words can in some
circumstance violate laws directed not against speech but against con-
duct, a particular content-based subcategory of prescribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute di-
rected at conduct rather than speech.98 "Thus, for example," he
pointed out, "sexually derogatory fighting words, among other words,
may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sex-
ual discrimination in employment practices." 99
Now, admittedly, this conceptual framework of fighting words re-
quires a great deal of development and certainly more than I can de-
scribe in the closing minutes of this talk. It's also much easier to apply
to directed speech or one-to-one as opposed to ambient harassment.
But it does give one suggestion for the way out.
96. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
97. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisor (1999) (providing that the duty of reasonable care "gener-
ally requires an employer to establish, disseminate, and enforce an anti- harassment policy and
complaint procedure and to take other reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment).
98. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
99. Id.
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As for the distinction that Professor Volokh gave between one-to-
one speech and speech that's not one-to-one, the one thing I would
say is that of all of the forms of harassment, it is not clear that individ-
uals are always most damaged by what's done one to one and that, in
many cases, the most dangerous form of harassment can include
things that are gone not just one-to-one relationships but in activities,
including speech activities, which affect a much larger range of
people.100
So in closing, I would say that I do think that the issue is a real one
but that there are potential ways out of it that are speech neutral and
that can alleviate some of the problems that Professor Volokh has
described.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: We're going to open the floor to questions now.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I have a question about this-what I hear is
a claim that the right of expressive association is not very useful to
invoke unless you are the Boy Scouts or Louis Farrakhan. I'm think-
ing specifically of a Christian Legal Society v. Walker.' ° ' In the major-
ity opinion by Judge Sykes, I think she makes a very clear statement
that when you have a religious organization, that has clear doctrinal
statement, politically among other things, extramarital sex, and re-
quires its officers and voting members to adhere to that to ensure that
the organization continues to promotes this message that it'll do so in
the future,102 I'm wondering whether you all think that we're likely to
see more Walkers in the future or whether we're more likely to see
cases in which the courts are more dismissive of the claims of religious
student organizations or religious organizations is any sort.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: I guess that's for me. So, there are two ba-
sic approaches to the law of expressive association. One is the ap-
proach in Roberts v. Jaycees,1°3 where the Court says that what you've
got to do is you've got to take a look at the message of the organiza-
tion, then you've got to look at the burden on the organization, and
you've got to decide whether the message is being burdened by this
particular restriction.
Now, there are going to be winners under that approach. I think
that Walker is this not the most transparent opinion in the world.
Some of it is that, and some of it seems to be a suggestion that was
100. See Kenneth L. Marcus, Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportu-
nism, 16 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 1025, 1054-55 (2008).
101. 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
102. Id.
103. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609.
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viewpoint discrimination be engaged in by the school, and viewpoint
discrimination is clearly out. But Dale purports to go farther than that
and say, well, if you're not sure what the organization's message or
even if you're quite sure that the organization's message is something
else, you've still got to defer. That entails a much broader expressive
association right, and that's the right that lower courts haven't known
what to do with.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: David.
PROFESSOR BERNSTEIN: So, a couple of things. First, I think Dale
might have actually gone a little too far in being deferential to the
Scouts. I'm not saying the Scouts didn't have a legitimate, you know,
view on this, and I don't have an opinion on that. But the courts say
we always believe an association basically when they claim what their
viewpoint is. I think that's a little dubious. I maybe there should be a
presumption in their favor.
But for example, we know that Bob Jones University, which I talked
about before, claimed to have this very strong theological belief that
interracial dating was forbidden. °4 Yet, when they came under a tre-
mendous amount of public pressure in 2000 after George Bush visited
there and it became a controversy, suddenly they explained, oh, this
was never really a theological belief; this was just something we did
because some parents had complained and we got rid of it. So, some-
times expressive associations sort of lie about these things, so I would
not be quite as deferential as the Dale Court was.
But I would say that, while Andy suggested that it's a little incoher-
ent for the Court to talk about expressive association, the right of ex-
pressive association because all discrimination laws can be seen as
prohibiting expression, the Court, of course, did distinguish between
organizations that are formed for expressive purposes and commercial
organizations. And this goes back to Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Roberts. 0 5
Now, Andy on the left and Richard Epstein on the right both say
that this distinction is incoherent, philosophically nonsensical, and a
means, to Andy's dismay and Richard's delight, that all civil rights
laws are unconstitutional. But even though I admit that philosoph-
ically I'm not sure I could justify exactly where the line would be, we
do know, in practice, what organizations will come on one side of the
line, and one group of those will be religious organizations.
104. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574.
105. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 631-32 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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Given what happened in the Smith case, and in fact that it's so hard
to bring Free Exercise claims, perhaps the main thing that Dale"°6 will
do is allow religious institutions like a religious school that wants to
fire a pregnant teacher, to make an expressive association claim,
where they really don't have much of a choice of doing that Free Ex-
ercise claim nowadays.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: On the other side, did you have something?
Eugene.
PROFESSOR VOLOKH: Yes. I just wanted to ask Andy something.
So, by the time of Dale,1 °7 the Boy Scouts had been loudly (inaudi-
ble) in litigation, but still in a way that was nationally prominent, say-
ing we don't approve of homosexuality. It may not have put it in the
Boy Scouts Handbook, but it was certainly speaking that. It may have
been triggered by the litigation for the very simple reason that, as
many gay rights activists point out, the standard way of conveying an
anti-gay agenda in the past has been to completely ignore homosexu-
ality. That was, in fact, the Boy Scouts' way of doing that. We would
prefer not to talk about homosexuality, pretend it's not there. But
once you're pushing us into it, now we're saying it's wrong; you might
not see morally straight meaning this, but we do and lots of our people
do, and that's how we understand "morally straight".
On top of that, in the Boy Scouts Handbook, there's all this talk
about sexuality. It's all heterosexual sexuality. It's all about keeping
sex within marriage-and that was before there was any same-sex mar-
riage. Why is-it seems to me that a finding that, well, the Boy Scouts
never really can (inaudible), it should have been reversed, perhaps not
even with much deference except the very modest deference that
when people are using ambiguous terms like "morally straight", you
kind of look to what community means by that and not what the rival
communities mean by that.
Wasn't it pretty clear, especially by 2000, the Boy Scouts really were
conveying a message that there's not something horrifically awful that
we're going to declaim in every Boy Scouts meeting, but something
not as good as heterosexuality about homosexuality.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: So, Eugene, it sounds like on your ap-
proach, in any litigation at least, as long as the litigation goes on long
enough for people to notice, the defendant is going to have a good
expressive association defense because the defendant is going to be
able to say, well, look, you know, we filed an answer to the complaint,
and then after we lost in the trial court, we filed a brief in the appeals
106. 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999).
107. Id.
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court. Shortly, by the time we get to the oral argument, it's clear that
we had a message. Why isn't this available in all anti-discrimination
PROFESSOR VOLOK1: Because even if it's an expressive association
that is claiming the right to choose not its members but its speakers,
then in that case, if it doesn't matter to me, then I don't think it should
matter to the court whether the expressive association has established
the message it's trying to send before the litigation or after.
What's important is if it's an expressive association that is now on
the record, now nationally known for taking a particular position, and
it is choosing its speakers, it should be entitled to choose speakers
whose identities and whose actions aren't in tension of that.1"8 Well,
why is that so bad? Just because they happen to bring it up or at least
make it public during litigation-not entirely, mind you. It's also an-
other context too.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: So, now you seem to be proposing a differ-
ent rule than rule the Court articulates in Dale,"°9 which is a rule that
antidiscrimination laws just don't apply to-I am not sure what the
predicate is here-entities that engage in expression. That probably
includes all businesses.
PROFESSOR VOLOKH: Well, I'm not sure, I mean, I'm not sure that's
right.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: Are there any businesses that don't engage
in expression?
PROFESSOR VOLOKH: Well-I'm sorry.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: That's fine. I think we've joined issue here, and
it's a very important issue, but we do have some, we've enticed a
couple of questioners out of the audience.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Jordan Lawrence of the Alliance Defense
Fund, and I'm representing Elane Photography in Albuquerque in the
photograph, wedding photograph thing. And I just, I didn't want to
say anything, but I wanted to ask some questions.
To Professor Koppelman, I just want to say the main trend in wed-
ding photography is photojournalism, and it's not anything like pass-
port headshots, and it's to basically make this photo essay of the
wedding. And so you have both the expression of the photography
with the messaging of the ceremony that's going on, so I think it's kind
of a double-compelled speech thing going on there. And I think if
somebody did say that in a passport photo situation, you would be
108. See Dale, 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999).
109. Id.
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right, but I think that many times these people are sought out because
they're really good at enhancing the whole ceremony and recording it.
And the two questions that I would just like you all to speak to is,
do you think that the First Amendment analysis is altered by the fact
that most people, if you're looking at somebody else's wedding pic-
tures, has no idea who took the pictures? Does it have to say, "I
Elane Huguenin, took these photos" before there's, you know, like
the Hurley situation?
And the other thing that I wanted to bring up is that we are having
an argument that's sort of a secondary one on whether a photographer
really meets the statutory definition of being a public accommodation.
And I think that that's an issue that doesn't get-it's like any business
of public accommodation. You know, a speechwriter can be forced to
write something he doesn't disagree with because he's earning money
by doing it. Is there a constitutional limitation to the police power of
a state to just put, you know, make anything discrimination across the
board? Or at least, the First Amendment would be. So, if you don't
know who took the photos, and is there a limit to the (inaudible) dis-
crimination law can have? Thank you.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Did you have a particular panelist you wanted
to address this to?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Any of them.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: All right, gentlemen. Start your motors.
PROFESSOR BERNSTEIN: I'll take the second part of that. With regard
to places of public accommodation, one thing I point out in my book
is that the framers of the '64 Civil Rights Act, 110 however you think of
that act as it applies to private parties, they did try to be sensitive to
civil liberties concerns, so they didn't limit Title II to places of public
accommodations, not to private organizations or non-accommoda-
tions.' 11 They did limit the scope of Title VII to employers of more
than 50 employees." 2 When they passed the Fair Housing Act"' and
the Mrs. Murphy exception" 4 so that it wouldn't apply to landlords
who are renting in their own, where they lived themselves, so they
wouldn't have to share their own personal space with people they
didn't want to, some of that has to be done by federal.
Very quickly, federal courts held that "public accommodations"
means any accommodation. But state laws since then have just oblit-
110. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1964).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
113. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1968).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1968).
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erated all these limits, so state laws will apply to any employer regard-
less of how many employees they have. They will apply to, not just to
any landlord-including roommate situations. There are circum-
stances-Eugene didn't mention this, but there is a New Jersey case
where one instance of sending around dirty jokes was considered suf-
ficient to be sexual harassment. And in particular, with regard to a
place of public accommodation, there is no limit on what that means
in many states.
So, that was exactly the basis for the New Jersey case in Dale.1 15
And of course, the Supreme Court can't overrule what the New Jersey
Supreme Court says about New Jersey law, but if you think about it,
the Boy Scouts of America is not a place, it's not public, it's not an
accommodation. That did not stop the New Jersey Supreme Court
from saying that the Boy Scouts of America is a public accommoda-
tion for the purposes of New Jersey antidiscrimination law.116
PROFESSOR BEVIER: Do other panelists wish to address this issue?
May I follow up on that just a minute, David? I take it that's state
supreme courts interpreting state law, and the legislature has just let it
go forward. So, the legislature could have come in and said that's not
what we meant; we meant to protect more privacy. But the legislature
has, in those cases, permitted the state supreme court to interpret
state law in that way.
PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN: The fact that places get interpreted meta-
phorically sometimes works to the benefit of speech, as in Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and University of Virginia,'17 where a student activities
fund was held to be a public forum. The Court said, well, not really
literally a forum since it isn't a place.11 So, the fact that a place isn't a
place can cut both ways.
PROFESSOR BEVIER: All right. Thank you. One more question. Yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes. This question is for Professor Volokh
and anybody else who'd like to comment on it. But maybe this is kind
of a theory from left field. But talking about the employment discrim-
ination cases regarding First Amendment speech protection, has there
been any arguments made regarding the secondary effects concept
and applying that in the area of employment, harassment, or speech
issues in employment? And if so-I know that whole line of jurispru-
dence seems to be somewhat confined to the adult entertainment
area, but has there been anything in terms of justifying positions on
115. Dale v Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999)
116. Dale, 160 N.J. at 591, 734 A.2d at 1211.
117. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
118. Id. at 830.
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free speech within the employment context using a secondary effects
analysis? And if so, are there any counter-arguments that have been
brought forth on that?
PROFESSOR VOLOKH: Yes. Very few courts actually talk about the
First Amendment issue, I think in part because very few lawyers raise
it. There's at least one case, early case, which mentioned this-just a
bit of legal background. So, generally speaking, content-neutral re-
strictions are much more easily upheld than content-based restric-
tions. This, on its face, seems quite clearly content based. It restricts
racist and sexist speech but not other kinds of speech. In fact, it's
viewpoint based. It restricts speech bigoted speech as well as some
other speech as well, but not (inaudible) speech. Now again, the moti-
vation for it is the harm that the speech supposedly causes, but that
harm stems from the message of the speech.
Now, the Court has come up with what I think is ultimately not a
very defensible position, but it came up with it in the so-called "eroge-
nous zoning" cases119, in the cases having to do with zoning of adult
movie theaters and the like, that if you're going after not the primary
effects of the speech but the secondary effects, like the possibility that
the speech will draw people who engage in crime or prostitution or
whatever else, so it will diminish property values. That's a secondary
effect, effect, and therefore the restrictions are permissible. If that
were so, then all campus speech codes would be constitutionally per-
missible, then Congress could just have a law that says-not even se-
vere or pervasive-saying, you know, we're going to ban all racist
speech in all workplaces, in all educational institutions, all places of
public accommodation. Why? Because it creates a secondary effect
of hostile environments.
In fact, however, the Court has, in many cases since the early eroge-
nous zoning cases, distinctly limited the secondary effects doctrine. 120
In particular, it said the emotional effects of the speech on the audi-
ence, be it either persuasive or the offensive effects of the speech, and
the harms that flow from those persuasive and offensive effects do not
counter the secondary effects. 121 Those are the primary effects, the
very kinds of effects the government cannot go after through content-
based restrictions. It held that in the R.A.V. case.122 It held that in
Forsyth County.'"3 It held that in Playboy Entertainment.a1 4 It's held
that in many, many cases.
119. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) See also United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
120. See id.
121. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
122. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
123. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
20091
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So, doctrinally, whatever arguments there might be for upholding it,
I think they're not, I think the secondary effects doctrine, even though
it's prevailed in at least one case, I think, is not defensible.
PANEL CONCLUDED
124. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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